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On the Language of Terrorism and International Law* 
J.A.S. Wild * * 
"You cannot go to war against an abstract noun" 
Sir Michael Howard, British historian, BBC interview, November 7th 2001 
Introduction 
One year on from the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, 
American military forces continue their actions in Afghanistan, and are now 
gearing up to attack Iraq. The "war on terrorism" is frequently cited by 
American political leaders and news commentators as a reasoned and sufficient 
justification for both the current and future military deployments. But at the 
very moment this justification is being proffered, dissenting voices can be heard. 
Opposition towards Washington's stance on the employment of force and a 
questioning of the very notion of "terrorism" are two of the constant themes 
raised by objectors. In this paper I want to concentrate on the second of these 
two themes, focusing on the difficulties associated with accurately 
characterizing and defining the concept of "terrorism," and the resultant limited 
capacity of international lawmakers to formulate anti-terrorist legislation. 
One cannot go far in the social sciences without stumbling over definitional 
problems and ordinarily such disputes as there are remain purely theoretical 
matters. Scholars will make clear their definitions and set their parameters as 
a preliminary to launching into their theses. However, when handling the 
notion of "terrorism," the implications of definitional problems spill outside the 
normal boundaries of academic discourse. Politicians and diplomats when 
trying to frame "anti-terrorist" legislation or build "anti-terrorist" international 
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coalitions, security experts when trying to shape "counter-terrorist" measures 
and journalists when trying to report events on the ground, all face the problem 
of pinning down what exactly they mean when they use the term "terrorism." 
Hopefully, my interpretation will go some way towards clarifying the 
difficulties associated with this pinning down and, further, shed some 
explanatory light upon the apparently crippled capability of international law to 
operate effectively when dealing with so called "terrorist acts." 
Terrorism as an Essentially Contested Concept 
To begin with, let me state that at the core of my approach is the premise 
that the concept of "terrorist" action falls into that category of ideas labelled as 
ineradicably evaluative, or, to borrow the famous phrase coined by philosopher 
(1) 
W.E.Gallie, "essentially contested." 
Elaborating, to say that "terrorism" is a contestable concept is to say that 
the criteria for designating any action as "terrorist action" are open to contest. 
To make the claim that such a concept is essentially contested denotes that 
there is no definitive standard that can be turned to, to adequately settle this 
contest. 
Philosophically, the main implication of such an approach is the rejection of 
all forms of universalism. Such universalist props as reason, natural law, the 
metaphysician's ideals and the believer's theological nostrums, whilst perhaps 
complete and coherent systems in themselves, can only provide us with 
competing standards, which, ultimately, are all equally inadequate as final 
explanatory frameworks. They can be considered to be, in William Connolly's 
apt description, "transcendental provincialism; [treating] the standards with 
which they are intimately familiar as universal criteria against which all other 
theories, practices, and ideals are to be assessed. They use universalist 
(2) 
rhetoric to protect provincial practices." 
Common Elements in the Language of Terrorism 
However, although a definitive standard for evaluating "terrorism" is 
rejected, the path to a usable definition is not entirely blocked. Following 
Wittgenstein's dictum to look for use rather than meaning, the various contexts 
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in which the designation "terrorist" is applied do have certain common 
elements. For a start, the term is always used to refer to actions and actors 
that have some socio-political agenda. Adapting from Clausewitz, one could 
say that "terrorism" is another manifestation of, "the continuation of politics by 
,3) 
other means." Yet this alone encompasses too much, and without further 
refinement an adequate definition will not be found. 
An examination of the specific events that get labelled "terrorist" reveals 
that functionally, "terrorism" has become a catch all term used to describe a 
whole host of different types of behaviour. The term has been extended to 
encompass widely disparate actors and actions, and has been applied to both 
governments and their opponents. 
Let us, for example, consider the current situation in the disputed lands 
stretching from the Mediterranean's eastern shores to the Jordan River. On 
the one hand, a Palestinian suicide bombing of an Israeli Army checkpoint may 
appear to those who carry it out as an heroic military stand, worthy of praise 
and emulation, but it will certainly strike others, who do not share the 
Palestinians' set of political values, as a futile and criminal act and, as a mark 
of condemnation, they will label it "terrorism." On the other hand, the Israeli 
government's policies, justified as essential for the maintenance of security, like 
the use of military forces to occupy Palestinian land, defend Jewish settlements 
in the occupied territories and assassinate opponents, are attacked as forms of 
"terrorism" by Palestinians and others who are opposed to the legitimacy of 
such policies. 
It is certainly the case that a list of the types of non-state action that most 
often get labelled as "terrorist;" bombings that destroy lives and property, 
assassinations/executions, kidnappings/hostage takings and various other forms 
of intimidation, can be matched item by item with a similar list of operations 
undertaken by states; the confiscation, occupation and destruction of property, 
killings by death squads, state sponsored executions, internment without trial, 
torture, threat, and even bombings, and these actions can, according to the 
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same rationale, be labelled as "terrorism" by the state. In other words, the 
term "terrorism" is attached to a broad range of actions taken by both state and 
non-state actors and, consequently, no amount of semantic gymnastics will 
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provide an adequate, uncontested definition that can relate solely to events that 
'5) 
have been given the label "terrorist." 
The failure to identify a clear definition that can be applied to specific 
actions illustrates the crucial point that political actions can have no single 
significance. Significance is determined not only by what the actors intend but 
also by what their actions are interpreted to mean by others irrespective of the 
actors' intentions, and those others, the interpreters, may ground their 
interpretations of significance upon a political value system or systems quite 
different from that held by the actors. 
This being the case, a second common element in the language of 
"terrorism" may be noted thus; that when the term "terrorism" is applied to any 
specific action, one finds endless disputes over appropriate meaning and 
definition. One academic study conducted in the early 1980s cited 109 
different definitions of "terrorism" advanced by scholars between the years 1931 
(6) 
and 1981. As if to distil an essence of meaning from these definitions, the 
author of the study isolated the following recurring elements in the order of 
their statistical appearance in the definitions: violence, force (appeared in 83.5% 
of the definitions); political issues (65%); fear, emphasis on inducing a sense of 
terror (51%); threats (47%); psychological effects and anticipated reactions 
(41.5%); discrepancy between the targets and the victims (37.5%); intentional, 
planned, systematic, organized action (32%); methods of combat, strategy, 
tactics (30.5%). 
Does the presence of recurring elements in the various definitions, draw us 
any closer to identifying specific actions upon which we can unambiguously pin 
the term "terrorism." I would argue that it does not, for the simple reason that 
designating any action as "terrorist action" implies a moral judgement on the 
part of the designator. 
This brings me to the third common element observable in every 
contemporary context where "terrorism" is designated. In the modern world 
the term "terrorism" is always a pejorative, and, as such, it is a designation 
swiftly turned to by those wishing to score propaganda points. "Terrorist" is a 
useful word of abuse for your enemies, and the term's offensive, indeed 
criminal, connotations create such political liabilities that nobody admits to 
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being a "terrorist" and "terrorism" is universally condemned. As the noted 
"terrorism" expert Brian Jenkins, has pointed out, if a group can successfully 
attach the label "terrorist" to its opponents then, in some sense, it has 
succeeded in having others adopt its moral and political point of view. 
The stigma that is now attached to "terrorism" can be contrasted with 
earlier periods. For example, at the turn of the century, the Russian socialist 
revolutionaries were proud to call themselves "terrorists." They had a 
"terrorist" arm called the "Terrorist Brigade" and were quite open in their 
intent to terrorize Russia's ruling elite through a policy of selective 
assassination. 
Ironically, given the current situation in the Middle East, probably the last 
group to proudly declare itself as "terrorist" was Lehi (the "Stern Gang") who 
fought against the British for Israel's independence in the 1940s. "Mekhabbel," 
is the word, translated as "terrorist," in modern Hebrew and used today to 
describe those organisations and individuals who have taken up arms against 
the Israeli state's policy of expansion into Palestinian territories. It is exactly 
the same word that members of Lehi used proudly to describe themselves in 
their armed guerrilla struggle against the British. In those days it was 
roughly translated as "saboteur." The meaning changed from neutral, 
"saboteur," to extremely negative, "terrorist," in the early days of the Israeli 
state, after the battle for independence had been won, and what had been won 
then had to be protected from others seeking to destroy the new state by the 
same means that were used in achieving statehood. 
Drawing together the three identified common elements in the language of 
"terrorism" - that it is a term applied to actions with a socio-political agenda, 
that designating "terrorist" action is always disputed and that use of the 
designation always holds an unambiguously pejorative connotation - it would 
seem that the accusation of "terrorism" perhaps reveals more about the attitude 
of the accusers than it does about the actions of the accused. In fact, I would 
go further and say that the term "terrorist" can do little other than describe this 
relationship between accuser and accused and, as such, it can only have relative 
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significance. If the designation has any undisputed, descriptive quality at all, 
it is in illustrating the disapproval that accusers have for that which they 
accuse. There can be no absolute definition independent of the accuser's point 
of view. For this reason, definitions of "terrorist" actions will always remain 
contested. In other words, "terrorism," like beauty, is in the eye of the 
beholder. 
An accurate, if somewhat restrained, phrasal synonym might be "in my 
opinion worthy of condemnation." It would follow, then, that when politicians 
and social commentators denounce "terrorism," they make no more sense than if 
they were complimenting the admirable or praising the praiseworthy. The 
object is implied by the verb, the statement is a tautology. 
Context and Contestability 
"Terrorism's" contestability recently took center-stage at a press conference 
in the Syrian capital, Damascus. British Prime Minister, Tony Blair had gone 
to Damascus to try to win the support of Syria's President Bashar al-Assad, for 
an international coalition against "terrorism;" what Mr Blair got was a lecture. 
The British newspaper The Independent, reported the press conference in the 
following terms: 
President Bashar al-Assad gave Mr Blair a dressing down, condemning 
the bombing of Afghan civilians and praising Palestinian armed groups 
as freedom fighters. The prime minister had to stand and listen as the 
Israelis were described as state terrorists and the west was accused of 
double standards and an inability to distinguish terrorism from self 
defence. .... President Assad told the press conference the military 
action in Afghanistan was mistaken. "We cannot accept what we see 
every day on our television screens - the killing of innocent civilians. 
There are hundreds dying everyday." He condemned terrorists, he 
said, "but we should differentiate between combating terrorism and 
war." ... The US and Britain have for many years been concerned about 
Syria's support for armed militant groups fighting Israel - including 
Hizbullah, Hamas and the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
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Palestine. Mr Assad defined these groups as freedom fighters. "We, 
and I personally, differentiate between resistance and terrorism. 
Resistance is a social, religious and legal right that is safeguarded by 
UN resolutions." ... "Israel is proving every day it is against peace, and 
the desire for peace cannot co-exist with a desire for killing. The list of 
assassinations cannot be an expression of a desire to bring peace and 
stability in the region. Israel is practising state terrorism every day> 
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The extent to which the conceptions of "terrorism" held by the West and by 
the Arab world diverge was well illustrated by the Assad-Blair press conference, 
and once more bore out the maxim that, "context is all in the analysis of 
(8) 
political violence." 
Acts of War or Criminal Acts? 
The historian Conor Cruise O'Brien, astutely elaborates on the political and 
ideological connotations intrinsic to any definition of "terrorism" by noting, 
"Those who are described as terrorists and who reject that title for themselves, 
make the uncomfortable point that national armed forces, fully supported by 
democratic opinion, have in fact employed violence and terror on a far vaster 
scale than anything that liberation movements have as yet been able to attain. 
The 'freedom fighters' see themselves as fighting a just war. Why should they 
not be able to kill burn and destroy as national armies navies and air forces do, 
and why should the label 'terrorist' be applied to them and not to the national 
(9) 
militaries?" 
The question is thus begged: should so-called "terrorist acts" be regarded as 
a form of war or are they, as those who condemn them contend, merely crimes? 
Hich Ramirez Sanchez, better known as Carlos the Jackal, one of the 
founders of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, clearly believed 
the former when he proclaimed at his trial in Paris, in December 1997, "I am 
(10) 
not a common criminal.... I am a revolutionary combatant." His clear 
implication was that he should be found innocent of the criminal charges 
brought against him because of his special status as a combatant. His claim is 
not an unusual one, indeed most groups that have the label "terrorist" attached 
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to them would seem to regard themselves as being in a state of war and justify 
their actions on that basis. 
Nobody is a "terrorist" who "stands for a just cause," Yasir Arafat famously 
(111 
told the United Nations. If we accept Arafat's statement then only to the 
extent that everyone can agree on the justice of a particular cause is there likely 
to be agreement that an action is or is not a "terrorist" action. 
Who is the Enemy? 
Where does this leave us? In a situation where actions labelled as 
"terrorist" from whatever source, are excused by their perpetrators as 
legitimate acts of war taken by combatants against a perceived enemy. 
One of the most disturbing aspects of this rationale is that it does not draw 
any distinction between legitimate targets and those that should be left alone. 
Anyone and anything can be made out to be a limb of the perceived enemy and 
thus attacked. Those who have employed this rationale, have commonly 
reasoned that all members of a group or class regarded as enemy are, ipso facto 
and indiscriminately, involved in its guilt. It is an idea that goes back at least 
as far as revolutionary France and Louis de Saint-Just's argument that Louis 
:121 
XVI should be brought to trial since, "no one can rule guiltlessly." In other 
words, to rule is to be guilty. From this position, it only requires the 
identification of a ruling class to set the stage for and justify persecution and 
punishment on a broad scale. This grim conclusion was indeed born out by 
subsequent developments in France as the revolution descended into the bloody 
Reign of Terror. 
Interestingly, it is from this bloody period of French history that the 
(13;' 
concept of "terrorism," originally a French word, became a part of the English 
political language and, ironically given its current common usage applied to 
persons in conflict with governments, it originally referred to the activities of a 
government, specifically, the French revolutionary government and its policy of 
intimidation. This government orchestrated French Terror was assigned the 
purpose of purification. Maximillian Robespierre proclaimed, "either virtue or 
the terror," "terror" was the tool to purge the land of the corrupting influence of 
the monarchy. The policy was carried out by "revolutionary tribunals," a type 
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of people's court that operated according to no previously recognized legal rules. 
The accused were "enemies of the people" possessing "impure hearts" and their 
fate at the guillotine was intended as an edifying lesson for the public to show 
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that the normal conceptions of guilt and innocence could not be applied. 
In the modern world, also, one does not have to look very far to find 
similarly grotesque persecutions. Social revolutionaries have targeted and 
exterminated "class enemies," those believing themselves privileged with sacred 
favour have done the same to "heretics," separatists have condemned 
"imperialists" and reactionary punishment has been directed at eliminating 
"enemies of the state." Violence has even been used by groups organized 
around single issues, who have proved increasingly willing to brand as "guilty" 
all those who do not appreciate and support the righteousness of their 
(15) 
particular cause. 
In the case of contemporary, radical Islamic movements, their belief 
systems make no allowance for a separation between religion and the state. 
God's law, the sharia, ought to be the same as the state's law. Therefore, 
Muslim politicians who attempt to frame their own laws and citizens who 
consent to live by those laws are apostates, and the punishment for apostasy in 
Islam is death. 
Problems in the Formulation of International Law 
If the only consistent application of the term "terrorism" is as an expression 
of condemnation directed at certain, normally violent, actions taken in 
accordance with some socio-political agenda, then we begin to get a picture of 
the difficulties facing UN legislators who attempt to formulate law that deals 
specifically with "terrorism." Encapsulating these difficulties, the eminent 
international lawyer Frits Kalshoven stated at the 1985 meeting of the 
American Society of International Lawyers, "I am acquainted with the use of 
the term [terrorism] in the media or by the police and even in legal writings, 
and often I can make a fairly shrewd guess what impression the user wishes to 
convey. But this is a far cry from saying I would be able to connect the term 
with a specific legal notion." 
Since there is no detached point of view from which we can expect definitive 
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answers to the core questions about the nature of "terrorism," the only way in 
which unanimity of opinion can be reached to allow the United Nations to 
pronounce on the issue is by stripping all of the meaning content from any such 
pronouncements. 
A classic example of this was the case, on December 9th 1985, when the 
(16) 
United Nations General Assembly, by a vote of 118-1 with 2 abstentions, 
adopted Resolution 40/61 condemning "as criminal, all acts, methods and 
practices of terrorism wherever and by whomever committed." 
Symptomatically, the resolution failed to define precisely what those "methods 
and practices of terrorism" were. It therefore avoided the tricky political 
question of attempting to differentiate permissible violence from unjustified 
violence. That is, it avoided the very issue that lies at the cent er of debate 
about what so-called "terrorism" encompasses. 
On the international stage, many governments in the Developing World, 
particularly those in Africa and Asia, have not cooperated with efforts, mostly 
American and European, to identify and combat phenomena labelled as 
"terrorism," through the international legal framework. A major reason for 
their reluctance is that they see such "anti-terrorist" efforts as part of a broader 
campaign aimed at outlawing the irregular methods of warfare that, in the 
twentieth century, were developed during the civil war in China and the post-
1945 anti-colonial struggles in Asia and Mrica; critical conflicts that resound as 
deeply in the liberation consciousness of the Developing World as the French 
Revolution does in the consciousness of the West. Not a few of the Developing 
World's leaders today, including perhaps the world's most revered elder 
statesman, Nelson Mandela, were at one time the leaders of insurgency groups 
and called "terrorists" themselves. It stands to reason, therefore, that these 
leaders are not prepared to countenance a definition of "terrorism" that includes 
the other means of struggle - "wars of liberation" or guerrilla warfare - which 
they once employed or which are now being employed on behalf of causes that 
:17) 
they support. 
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Routes Around Relativism 
Without any consensus on whether there can be acceptable acts of violence, 
attempts to legislate against something called "terrorism" will always be 
rendered difficult and open to challenge by those who do not share the world 
view and political values of the legislators. 
Be that as it may, it has not prevented the international community from 
attempting to address the problem of "terrorism" through international law. 
There have been two main routes around the obstacle of relativism. One route 
has been to avoid definitions altogether and, instead, has concentrated upon the 
specific tactics often adopted by those labelled as "terrorists," formulating 
legislation in a piecemeal fashion to deal with problems as they have arisen. 
The 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of 
Maritime Navigation, promoted and drafted as a direct result of the hijacking of 
OS) 
the Italian cruise ship, Achille Lauro, is one example of this kind of legislation. 
The second route around relativism has been to focus upon the criminal 
nature of the so-called "terrorist" acts. Homicide, kidnapping, threats to life 
and the wilful destruction of property appear in the domestic criminal codes of 
every country. Those accused of terrorism may claim, like Carlos, to be 
soldiers at war, whose combat status privileges them to break ordinary laws 
against killing, but even in war there are rules that outlaw the use of certain 
weapons and tactics. 
The laws of war grant civilian non-combatants who are not associated with 
valid targets at least theoretical immunity from deliberate attack. They 
prohibit taking hostages. They prohibit violence against those held captive. 
They define belligerents. They define neutral territory. These rules are 
sometimes violated and, in these cases, those responsible for the violations 
become war criminals. The violations themselves in no way diminish the 
validity of the rules. In this way, those labelled as "terrorists," who assert that 
they are waging war, face the prospect of having many oftheir actions outlawed 
as war crimes. 
It is this route through the laws of war that international lawyers are now 
taking in their efforts to find applicable legal tools with which they can confront 
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those actions and actors labelled as "terrorist." They suggest that rather than 
trying to negotiate new treaties dealing specifically with the amorphous concept 
of "terrorism," which are unlikely to be ratified or enforced, nations should 
apply the laws of war, to which almost all have agreed. In this case the law 
would be used as though it were dealing with soldiers who commit atrocities. 
Most countries have now agreed to either bring to trial themselves or else try to 
extradite soldiers who commit atrocities in international armed conflicts. So 
that under the laws of war approach, actions condemned as "terrorist" would be 
those actions that infringe against the laws of war and thus constitute war 
crimes. In this way, efforts are being instigated to deal with so called "terrorist" 
acts within an already established legal framework. 
International law makers will only ever stumble if they insist upon clinging 
to an unhelpful vocabulary that draws clear semantic boundaries around a 
notion of "terrorism." Legislators need to recognise that there can be no 
functional semantic distinction between "terrorism" and those other oft used 
genera, guerrilla warfare and conventional warfare. Hence, international 
legislation crafted specifically to confront "terrorism" is unworkable. If this 
means that the comfortable categories of war and peace become more 
ambiguous, then so much the better. For, as a result of the destructiveness of 
modern weaponry and the fragility of parts of our modern technological 
civilization, contemporary societies are, increasingly, going to have to face up to 
and defend themselves against violent challenges even during periods when no 
obvious war is occurring. 
Washingtonspeak and the Desire to Escape Politics 
Washington has placed the United States on a war footing. This 
accurately reflects the level of threat that is being faced. But to identify the 
enemy as "terrorism" is a deliberate abstraction for propaganda purposes. 
To declare a "war on terrorism," as George W. Bush has done, is to deny the 
context dependent, contested nature of "terrorism." To vow, as US Secretary of 
State, Colin Powell did the day after the September, 2001 attack on the World 
Trade Center, "to go after terrorism and get it by its branch and its root" is to 
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invite accusations of hypocrisy by those who do not share Washington's 
worldview. 
It is hardly surprising that in recent newspaper reports we should read the 
voices of public dissent like the Lebanese construction manager, who told The 
Independent's Robert Fisk, 
"I'm sick of hearing about terrorism, terrorism, terrorism ... when you have 
enemies, they are 'terrorists' or 'madmen' or 'evildoers'. When we have 
enemies, we are asked to compromise with them. You have Bin Laden. We 
(19) 
have Sharon - who is your friend and whose hand Mr Bush shakes." 
And the Mghani doctor, 
"If Osama acted like a terrorist, then so are the Americans acting like 
(20) 
terrorists now." 
When President Bush presents foreign governments with the dichotomy, 
"Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists," he is attempting to 
impose Washington's lexicon upon the international community. For Bush, 
there is nothing contestable about who are the "us" and who are the "terrorists." 
William Connolly has described this "desire to expunge contestability" as 
expressing "a wish to escape politics. It emerges either as a desire to 
rationalize public life, placing a set of ambiguities and contestable orientations 
under the control of a settled system of understandings and priorities, or as a 
quest to moralize public life thoroughly, bringing all citizens under the control 
(2]) 
of a consensus which makes politics marginal and unimportant." 
The Bush administration, through its unequivocal rhetoric seeks to 
depoliticise the whole issue of "terrorism" in order that its priorities and its 
morality become the consensus viewpoint. Naturally, those whose worldviews 
have been forged in very different environments, i.e. most of the world outside 
of the United States, are not about to submit to this Washingtonspeak. 
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APPENDIX 
Conventions Against Terrorism 
(For full details see http://www.undcp.org/odccp/terrorism_conventions.html) 
There are 12 major multilateral conventions and protocols related to states' 
responsibilities for combating terrorism. But many states are not yet party to 
these legal instruments, or are not yet implementing them. 
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In addition to these treaties, other instruments may be relevant to particular 
circumstances, such as bilateral extradition treaties, the 1961 Vienna 
Convention on Diplomatic Relations, and the 1963 Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations. Moreover, there are now a number of important UN 
Security Council and General Assembly Resolutions on international terrorism, 
dealing with specific incidents. 
The following list identifies the major terrorism conventions and protocols and 
provides a brief summary of some of the major terms of each instrument. In 
addition to the provisions summarized below, most of these conventions provide 
that parties must establish criminal jurisdiction over offenders (e.g., the state(s) 
where the offence takes place, or in some cases the state of nationality of the 
perpetrator or victim). 
1. Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed On 
Board Aircraft ("Tokyo Convention", 1963 - safety of aviation): 
-applies to acts affecting in-flight safety; 
-authorizes the aircraft commander to impose reasonable measures, including 
restraint, on any person he or she has reason to believe has committed or is 
about to commit such an act, when necessary to protect the safety of the 
aircraft; 
-requires contracting states to take custody of offenders and to return control of 
the aircraft to the lawful commander. 
2. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft 
("Hague Convention", 1970 - aircraft hijackings): 
-makes it an offence for any person on board an aircraft in flight [to] 
"unlawfully, by force or threat thereof, or any other form of intimidation, [to] 
seize or exercise control of that aircraft" or to attempt to do so; 
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-requires parties to the convention to make hijackings punishable by "severe 
penalties"; 
-requires parties that have custody of offenders to either extradite the offender 
or submit the case for prosecution; 
-requires parties to assist each other in connection with criminal proceedings 
brought under the convention. 
3. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety 
of Civil Aviation ("Montreal Convention", 1971 - applies to acts of 
aviation sabotage such as bombings aboard aircraft in flight): 
-makes it an offence for any person unlawfully and intentionally to perform an 
act of violence against a person on board an aircraft in flight, if that act is likely 
to endanger the safety of that aircraft; to place an explosive device on an 
aircraft; and to attempt such acts or be an accomplice of a person who performs 
or attempts to perform such acts; 
-requires parties to the convention to make offences punishable by "severe 
penalties"; 
-requires parties that have custody of offenders to either extradite the offender 
or submit the case for prosecution; 
4. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against 
Internationally Protected Persons (1973 - outlaws attacks on senior 
government officials and diplomats): 
-defines internationally protected person as a Head of State, a Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, a representative or official of a state or of an international 
organization who is entitled to special protection from attack under 
international law; 
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-requires each party to criminalize and make punishable "by appropriate 
penalties which take into account their grave nature", the intentional murder, 
kidnapping, or other attack upon the person or liberty of an internationally 
protected person, a violent attack upon the official premises, the private 
accommodations, or the means of transport of such person; a threat or attempt 
to commit such an attack; and an act "constituting participation as an 
accomplice"; 
5. International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages ("Hostages 
Convention", 1979): 
-provides that "any person who seizes or detains and threatens to kill, to injure, 
or to continue to detain another person in order to compel a third party, namely, 
a State, an international intergovernmental organization, a natural or juridical 
person, or a group of persons, to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit 
or implicit condition for the release of the hostage commits the offence of taking 
of hostage within the meaning ofthis Convention"; 
6. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material ("Nuclear 
Materials Convention", 1980 - combats unlawful taking and use of 
nuclear material): 
-criminalizes the unlawful possession, use, transfer, etc., of nuclear material, 
the theft of nuclear material, and threats to use nuclear material to cause death 
or serious injury to any person or substantial property damage; 
7. Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports 
Serving International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety 
of Civil Aviation (Extends and supplements the Montreal Convention 
on Air Safety), (1988): 
-extends the provisions of the Montreal Convention (see No. 3 above) to 
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encompass terrorist acts at airports serving international civil aviation. 
8. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety 
of Maritime Navigation, (1988 - applies to terrorist activities on 
ships): 
-establishes a legal regime applicable to acts against international maritime 
navigation that is similar to the regimes established against international 
aviation; 
-makes it an offence for a person unlawfully and intentionally to seize or 
exercise control over a ship by force, threat, or intimidation; to perform an act of 
violence against a person on board a ship if that act is likely to endanger the 
safe navigation of the ship; to place a destructive device or substance aboard a 
ship; and other acts against the safety of ships; 
9. Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of 
Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf (1988 - applies to 
terrorist activities on fixed offshore platforms): 
-establishes a legal regime applicable to acts against fixed platforms on the 
continental shelf that is similar to the regimes established against international 
aviation; 
10. Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of 
Detection (1991 - provides for chemical marking to facilitate 
detection of plastic explosives, e.g., to combat aircraft sabotage): 
-designed to control and limit the used of unmarked and undetectable plastic 
explosives (negotiated in the aftermath of the 1988 Pan Am 103 bombing); 
-parties are obligated in their respective territories to ensure effective control 
over "unmarked" plastic explosive, i.e., those that do not contain one of the 
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detection agents described in the Technical Annex to the treaty; 
-generally speaking, each party must, among other things: take necessary and 
effective measures to prohibit and prevent the manufacture of unmarked plastic 
explosives; prevent the movement of unmarked plastic explosives into or out of 
its territory; exercise strict and effective control over possession and transfer of 
unmarked explosives made or imported prior to the entry-into-force of the 
convention; ensure that all stocks of such unmarked explosives not held by the 
military or police are destroyed or consumed, marked, or rendered permanently 
ineffective within three years; take necessary measures to ensure that 
unmarked plastic explosives held by the military or police, are destroyed or 
consumed, marked, or rendered permanently ineffective within fifteen years; 
and, ensure the destruction, as soon as possible, of any unmarked explosives 
manufactured after the date-of-entry into force of the convention for that state. 
11. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing 
(1997): (UN General Assembly Resolution) 
-creates a regime of universal jurisdiction over the unlawful and intentional 
use of explosives and other lethal devices in, into, or against various defined 
public places with intent to kill or cause serious bodily injury, or with intent to 
cause extensive destruction of the public place; 
12. International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 
Terrorism (1999): 
-requires parties to take steps to prevent and counteract the financing of 
terrorists, whether direct or indirect, though groups claiming to have 
charitable, social or cultural goals or which also engage in such illicit activities 
as drug trafficking or gun running; 
-commits states to hold those who finance terrorism criminally, civilly or 
administratively liable for such acts; 
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-provides for the identification, freezing and seizure of funds allocated for 
terrorist activities, as well as for the sharing of the forfeited funds with other 
states on a case-by-case basis. Bank secrecy will no longer be justification for 
refusing to cooperate. 
